

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

NSC review completed.

National Intelligence Officers

DDI #2460-82

29 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

VIA : National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces

FROM : [redacted] 25X1

Assistant NIO for General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT : NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section C

1. On 25 March, I attended a meeting at the NSC to review the latest draft of the military objectives section of NSSD 1-82. Copies of the drafts (including a summary as well as two issues) are forwarded as Attachments 1 and 2. It is expected that these two issues will be incorporated into a single issue which will read something like: "In order for the U.S. to achieve its peacetime military objectives, is it necessary to tailor and develop a specific military capability for Southwest Asia or is it sufficient to rely on forces intended for a global capability?" [redacted]

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2. Although the changes to the military objectives section since the last iteration are extensive, there is little change in substance. The section has been shortened, and some JCS language has been included. I also have some annotations made by Fred Ikle on a previous edition of Part III-C if you would be interested in seeing it [redacted]

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3. Drafts of NSSD-1 discussed at the meeting last Tuesday have gone to the President who is acting as "principal" in this stage of the review. The NSC will take up Parts I, II and III (A-C) on 15 April in a one-hour session beginning at 1400. [redacted]

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4. You may have missed the column on NSSD-1 by Joseph Kraft printed in the 25 March issue of The Washington Post (Attachment 3). [redacted]

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Attachments:

1. NSSD 1-82, Part III-C  
Summary Conclusions
2. Section C, with Issues
3. Joseph Kraft Column, dtd. 3/25/82  
The Washington Post

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cc: NIC/AG, [redacted]

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when separated from attachments

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NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section C  
 Regional Military Objectives  
 Summary Conclusions

The wartime strategy of the United States is to employ military force to achieve our political objectives and secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. In so doing, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of any conflict to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests.

For general wartime planning, the highest priority is the defense of North America, followed by NATO, and the supporting sea lines of communication. Second priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by the defense of our Pacific allies, supporting sea lines of communication, and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa. Specific U.S. wartime and peacetime regional objectives are keyed to this global context.

In Europe, our primary military objective is to strengthen the NATO Alliance and its capability to deter or defeat a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The defense of Europe remains vital to the national security of the United States. In wartime, the United States will support NATO's current strategy which requires an integrated forward defense with conventional forces and, if necessary, by the use of theater and strategic nuclear forces in order to protect the territorial integrity of Western Europe. In peacetime, U.S. objectives will be to raise the nuclear threshold by improving NATO's conventional posture, to secure a more effective division of labor among NATO members, and to obtain increased Allied contributions.

In the Near East/Southwest Asia, the two primary security interests of the U.S. are to prevent the spread of Soviet influence and to maintain continued access to Persian Gulf oil. In the region, the U.S. has three key objectives: deter or defeat Soviet military aggression, maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any combination of adversaries, and to support moderate states against external aggression and subversion. In wartime, the basic U.S. objective is to protect the oil fields, transshipment points and sea lines of communication essential to Western security. In peacetime, our key objective is to acquire, by the end of the decade, the capacity to defeat a Soviet attack without having to spread the conflict beyond the region and its supporting sea lines of communication.

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Review March 25, 2002

Classified &amp; Extended by William P. Clark

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In the Far East, a direct U.S.-Soviet conflict is unlikely except in the context of a general war. Therefore, regional wartime objectives are supportive of global wartime goals: to maintain sea control necessary to support the global requirements of our strategy, to prevent the redeployment of Soviet forces from the Far East, to protect U.S. bases in the region, and to secure major regional contributions from Japan. In peacetime, we seek to develop an active defense partnership with Japan, to maintain the PRC as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, and to prevent the Soviet Union or Vietnam from achieving a dominant position in Southeast Asia.

In the Western Hemisphere, the United States seeks to blunt and contain the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America. Coupled with our overall global wartime priorities, this means that in wartime, U.S. objectives will be to defend North America, to maintain sea control, and to neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in the Caribbean Basin. In peacetime, our objectives are to modernize North America's strategic air defense system, to reverse Communist gains in Latin America, to foster bilateral and multilateral military cooperation, and to increase the level and tempo of U.S. military presence and access.

In Africa, we seek to deny Soviet control or influence over key African states from which they could prevent Western access to Africa's mineral resources or interdict the supply of oil to Western Europe and the United States. In wartime, our objectives will be to neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in strategic locations and to protect access to the region's mineral resources. In peacetime, we will continue to seek base access and to assist countries resisting Soviet and Soviet-sponsored subversion.

ISSUES. Two issues surfaced as a result of this portion of the study.

1. Should it be a peacetime objective of the United States, by the end of the decade, to build the capability necessary to achieve our wartime objectives in Southwest Asia through operations restricted to the region and supporting sea lines of communication?
2. On what basis should U.S. conventional military forces be sized? (NOTE: The resolution of this issue must await analysis that is the subject of subsequent sections.)

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LAST PAGE**I. Global****A. Introduction**

The wartime strategy of the U.S. is to employ military force to achieve our political objectives and secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. In doing so, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of any conflict with the Soviet Union to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests. Contingency planning should, however, include options for military actions in regions of clear U.S. advantage to dissuade the Soviets from continuing their attack. In this context, the threat of geographic escalation is an essential element of U.S. strategy, but is not a substitute for adequate military capability. Moreover, since the Soviet Union enjoys war-widening options at least as attractive as ours, and particularly since geographic and nuclear escalation considerations are linked, U.S. interests demand careful control of escalation.

**B. Priorities for Wartime Resource Allocation**

The following broad prioritization is accurate for general wartime planning over a wide range of scenarios:

- The highest priority is the defense of North America (including Hawaii, Alaska and Caribbean SLOCs), followed by the NATO areas and the LOCs leading there to.
- The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by defense of U.S. Pacific allies and the LOCs for the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa.
- U.S. actions in other parts of the world will be designed to protect essential U.S. interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia.

**C. Equitable Burdensharing.** Many nations with living standards equal to the U.S. contribute markedly less to the common defense and to assistance to poorer nations than does the U.S. In 1982 and beyond, U.S. "quiet diplomacy" must be much firmer in insisting upon increased defense efforts by laggard but affluent nations.

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Review March 24, 2002

Classified & Extended by William P. Clark ~~TOP SECRET~~

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## II. Regional Objectives

Where conflict against the Soviet Union is the scenario, regional objectives provide only rough guidelines and must be viewed in the context of the global power balance at the termination of hostilities.

### A. Europe

The security of Europe is inextricably linked to that of the United States and will become more so over the course of this decade. The unprecedented challenges to Western security, coupled with a continuing growth in economic interdependence, mandate a firm commitment by nations on both sides of the Atlantic to the coalition warfare strategy of NATO. While intra-Alliance problems such as burden-sharing and anti-nuclear movements exist, it will be increasingly important that we continue to recognize that the defense of Europe is vital to the national security of the United States.

NATO strategy MC14/3 stresses defense along the forward edge of NATO territory, supported by the possibility of nuclear escalation if NATO is losing conventionally. This nuclear linkage -- and uncertainty -- is important to deterrence. But the Europeans must not be permitted to use nuclear linkage as an excuse for not funding conventional defense forces. Our policy should be to support MC14/3, while stressing that nuclear parity means a strong conventional defense is necessary for deterrence as well as for defense. While improvements are required across the full spectrum of the Alliance's military capabilities, a major increase over current efforts is especially required from all other members with regard to conventional capability. Without such an increase the nuclear threshold could be lowered as the Soviets continue increasing their capabilities. Additionally, NATO should enhance deterrence through closer Allied coherence, and clearer expression of political will.

Within the context outlined above, the following are the specific U.S. military objectives for the European region:

### Wartime Objectives

- To protect the territorial integrity of Western Europe.
- To defeat a Warsaw Pact attack with conventional forces in a forward defense and if necessary by the use of theater nuclear, and finally strategic nuclear forces in integrated operations to prevent failure of the conventional defense.

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- To fully engage all NATO members in the conflict.

- To be able to sustain a long war.

- To weaken the Warsaw Pact's ability to wage war by engaging Pact forces on their own territory, disrupting their LOCs, and fragmenting the cohesion of the Pact alliance.

- To establish and maintain control of Atlantic LOCs.

#### Peacetime Military Objectives

- To enhance NATO's conventional defense capabilities to raise the nuclear threshold while also improving nuclear deterrence.

- To achieve increased Allied contributions to the defense of Western Europe and from those Allies capable of doing so increased contributions in other areas of mutual benefit, to include Southwest Asia.

- To secure a more effective division of labor within NATO through cooperative efforts such as Host Nation Support Agreements.

B. Near East/Southwest Asia. The United States has two primary national security interests in the region. The first is to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-military hegemony in the region. This requires that the U.S. support the sovereignty of the regional states in order to stabilize U.S. regional relationships. The second is to maintain continued access to Persian Gulf oil. This means that the U.S., in concert with intra- and extraregional allies and friends must be prepared to meet threats of any magnitude, from internal subversion to large scale Soviet aggression.

In this context, defense policy has three overriding objectives:

1. Deter or defeat Soviet overt military aggression and protect Western access to oil. To do this, U.S. defense planning has three tiers. First, we must plan for and demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF -- Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force -- quickly into the region to prevent a Soviet fait accompli. Additional support from intra- and extraregional allies and friends must be obtained to support RDJTF requirements. Our private pressure upon them for realistic joint planning must be unremitting.

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Second, if deterrence fails, we must plan to combat and defeat the Soviets in the theater.

The third tier of Defense objectives is to prepare for executing warwidening options.

2. Maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any combination of Arab foes. As the most militarily powerful state in the region, Israel's assistance would be of considerable benefit in the course of a conflict with the Soviets, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, as augmentation for the Southern Flank.

3. Support moderate states against external aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms sales to help strengthen substantially the self-defense capabilities of key states in the region.

To accomplish these objectives for the region, the U.S. expects regional states to contribute to the extent possible to their own defense as well as assisting in supporting the employment of U.S. forces. Allies will be expected to offer their facilities for the deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia. Additionally, they should be encouraged to contribute militarily to specific threats if such participation would not substantially reduce their war fighting capability in their home region and would provide a beneficial contribution to the conflict.

Within the context outlined above, the following are the specific U.S. military objectives for the Near East, Southwest and South Asia region:

#### Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To secure the oil fields, transshipment points and sea lines of communications essential to Western security. (This includes threats of all magnitude from internal subversion to Soviet aggression.)
- To preserve the independence of Israel.
- To engage friendly regional states, Western Allies and other extra-regional states in the execution of our strategy.

#### Peacetime Military Objectives

- To prevent Soviet hegemony and extension of influence.

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To acquire, by the end of the decade, the capacity to defeat a Soviet attack against Southwest Asia without having to spread the conflict beyond the region and its supporting SLOCs.

To maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any combination of Arab foes.

To support moderate states against external aggression and subversion.

To ensure access to a network of military facilities in the region for the rapid introduction and sustainment of sizable U.S. forces.

To obtain overflight, landing, bunkering and access to enroute facilities for the deployment and support of U.S. combat forces.

To obtain military contributions (including agreements for combat forces) from selected Allies in support of U.S. objectives in the region.

To maintain a strong naval presence in the area, together with a substantial presence on land as can be managed given regional sensitivities and political constraints.

To increase peacetime planning with regional states for wartime contingencies, including host nation support, prepositioning, and combat roles for indigenous forces.

C.

Far East. Our foremost peacetime objective in the Far East is, in conjunction with our allies and other friends in the region, to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence in East Asia and the Pacific. Asian security relationships are fundamental to offsetting successfully Soviet global ambitions. U.S. strategy in East Asia and the Pacific is predicated on the stabilizing relationship between two security anchors. One anchor in Northeast Asia depends on cooperation among the U.S., Korea, and Japan, as well as the U.S. relationship with China. The other anchor in the Pacific Basin binds the U.S. to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the somewhat more loosely to the remainder of ASEAN. Continued U.S. and allied force improvements and strengthened U.S. security relationships are required to establish and maintain an effective defensive network secured at both ends of the region. A direct U.S.-Soviet conflict in Asia is unlikely except in the context of a global war. Therefore, although other contingencies in the region could involve U.S. forces in hostilities short of U.S.-Soviet conflict, regional wartime objectives in Asia listed below are those supportive of global wartime objectives.

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To maintain control of the Pacific lines of communication, including those to the Indian Ocean, and the bases needed to support the global strategy.

To fulfill commitments to the Asian allies, given particular emphasis to protection of U.S. bases in the region, and seek to preclude a Soviet decision to redeploy forces for use against NATO.

To have Japan participate in regional defense, including providing for its own defense, including SLOC and air protection to 1,000 miles.

To have the PRC maintain military initiatives that would fix Soviet ground, air and naval forces in the USSR's Far Eastern territories.

Peacetime Military Objectives

To transform our relationship with Japan into an active defense partnership in which Japan significantly increases its own defense capabilities and contributes to regional defense.

To continue to develop our relationship with the PRC in ways which maintain the PRC as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, enhance the durability of U.S.-PRC ties, and lay the foundation for closer future cooperation as appropriate.

To maintain sufficient U.S. and allied strength on the Korean Peninsula to ensure stability there, and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in defeating hostile forces. Enhance deterrence, where possible, without major increased commitments of U.S. resources.

To increase peacetime planning with our allies for wartime contingencies.

To have other regional states assume a greater share of the responsibility for the common defense and assist them in improving their capabilities to fulfill it.

To the support of regional states for U.S. power projection from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

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- To prevent the Soviet Union or Vietnam from achieving a dominant presence in Southeast Asia from which to foster actions inimical to our interests and those of our allies.

D. Western Hemisphere

The defense of North America is this nation's primary security concern. Since World War II, defense of the Western Hemisphere has meant that the U.S. would maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, develop closer relations with Canada and Mexico, and foster collective security arrangements among Latin American countries. It is becoming increasingly clear that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foregone conclusion. The U.S. must continue to build on interests shared with Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin America not as a Third World area removed from the traditional focus of U.S. strategy, but as a contiguous region whose future bears directly on the security of the hemisphere as a whole.

Latin America, and especially the Caribbean/Central American region, is an area with which we are closely associated by virtue of our Gulf Coast and Mexican borders, our dependence in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and the critical Panama Canal waterway. Nearly half of our trade and two-thirds of our imported oil pass through the Caribbean. Moreover, in event of war, half of NATO's supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through the Caribbean to Europe.

The South American continent is also a focus of major U.S. interests. Though strategically less pivotal to us than the Caribbean, South America includes several nations with which we enjoy long-standing close relations and which are among our most important trade partners. In addition, the east coast of South America faces the South Atlantic sea routes which represent a major petroleum lifeline for Europe and the United States.

Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To defend North America (including Hawaii, Alaska and the contiguous Caribbean Basin).
- To neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in the Caribbean Basin.
- To control LOCs in the Caribbean, South Atlantic, and South Pacific including the Panama Canal.

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To prevent further aggression and subversion against regional states by forces hostile to U.S. interests.

Peacetime Military Objectives

- To modernize the strategic air defense system for North America.
- To reverse Communist gains in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada and other areas in Latin America.
- To broaden regional military-to-military contacts and seek the active military cooperation of key countries in regional territorial defense, in the security of Caribbean Basin, South Atlantic and South Pacific sea lines of communication and in facilitating air and ocean movement.
- To maintain, or acquire as needed, base and facilities access, logistical support, and operating, transit, and overflight rights.
- To increase the level and exercise tempo of U.S. military presence in the region.

E. Africa. Africa's mineral resources (including oil), plus its strategic location astride the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf, make it of prime importance in economic (and therefore political) terms; the military requirement for the West is essentially preemptive: to deny the Soviets control over key African states and territory from which they could interdict the supply of minerals and oil from Africa and the Middle East. In case of a military struggle for control of the Middle East, Africa is important as a strategic territory for the movement of major Western forces to the area via the Mediterranean, across North Africa, or across Central Africa. It is also equally important, offering facilities from which both air and naval forces could operate to destroy Soviet naval threats to the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, around the Cape, and the south Atlantic.

In peacetime, in addition to being a major source for minerals important to U.S., West European and Japanese industry, Africa remains an important area for the political contest of Western and Soviet Bloc values in the Third World. The West must counter, and the U.S. must play a larger role, in meeting the Soviet/proxy challenge. Principal elements currently available are economic and security

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assistance. Successful implementation of a counter-Soviet strategy in Africa will also require the development of a climate of supportive Congressional and public opinion lacking since the Vietnam era, and the restoration of substantial "internal security" and covert action capabilities.

#### Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To employ air and naval forces to neutralize Soviet or other hostile forces in strategic locations in the region and adjacent waters.
- To protect access to and deny Soviet use of the region's mineral resources, key facilities, and LOCs.

#### Peacetime Military Objectives

- To gain base access and transit rights in pro-Western African states for the deployment and subsequent support of U.S. forces to Africa, Southwest Asia, South Atlantic, and contiguous areas and work to deny the Soviets similar access.
- To assist countries throughout Africa that are the targets of Soviet proxy, Libyan and Ethiopian aggressive, subversive or terrorist actions.

#### ISSUES

1. As a peacetime objective in Southwest Asia, should the U.S. build the capability to achieve our wartime objectives through operations restricted to the region and the supporting SLOCs?
2. On what basis should U.S. conventional military forces be sized?

The resolution of this issue must await analysis that is the subject of subsequent sections. Nevertheless, the answer to this issue will influence significantly the peacetime priorities for resource allocation and may require adjustment of peacetime regional military objectives. Therefore, this section will be subject to revision pending resolution of the issue. In order to provide appropriate examination of this issue, a range of options will be examined in Section E.

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